AphantasiaResearch
Explore a comprehensive collection of academic papers, research studies, and scientific publications about aphantasia, imagery, and cognitive neuroscience.
Slower but more accurate mental rotation performance in aphantasia linked to differences in cognitive strategies
People with aphantasia, who lack visual imagery, perform mental rotation tasks slower but more accurately than those with imagery. They use analytic strategies instead of visual ones, showing that visual imagery isn't essential for these tasks. This highlights the adaptability of human cognition in problem-solving.
Kay, L., Keogh, R., & Pearson, J. (2024). Slower but more accurate mental rotation performance in aphantasia linked to differences in cognitive strategies. Consciousness and Cognition, 121, 103694. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2024.103694
Revisiting the blind mind: Still no evidence for sensory visual imagery in individuals with aphantasia
Aphantasia, the inability to visualize, shows a lack of sensory imagery. In a study with over 50 participants, those with aphantasia had significantly lower imagery scores compared to the general population, confirming that aphantasia involves more than just metacognitive differences.
Keogh, R., & Pearson, J. (2024). Revisiting the blind mind: still no evidence for sensory visual imagery in individuals with aphantasia. Neuroscience Research, 201, 27–30. doi:10.1016/j.neures.2024.01.008
Multisensory subtypes of aphantasia: Mental imagery as supramodal perception in reverse
Aphantasia is a diverse condition where some people can't visualize images in their mind. It can affect just visual imagery or all senses, like sound and smell. Research shows different sub-groups exist, with some retaining imagery in one sense. Understanding these variations helps explore how our brains process mental imagery.
Dawes, A. J., Keogh, R., & Pearson, J. (2024). Multisensory subtypes of aphantasia: mental imagery as supramodal perception in reverse. Neuroscience Research, 201, 50–59. doi:10.1016/j.neures.2023.11.009
Fewer intrusive memories in aphantasia: using the trauma film paradigm as a laboratory model of PTSD
People with aphantasia, who lack visual imagery, experience fewer intrusive memories after trauma compared to those with visual imagery. Their intrusions are mainly verbal, not visual, suggesting that visual imagery plays a key role in the intensity of PTSD symptoms.
Keogh, R., Wicken, M., & Pearson, J. (n.d.). Fewer intrusive memories in aphantasia: using the trauma film paradigm as a laboratory model of ptsd. doi:10.31234/osf.io/7zqfe
Memories with a blind mind: Remembering the past and imagining the future with aphantasia
People with aphantasia, who struggle to form mental images, recall fewer details about past and future events compared to others. This is due to reduced visual detail retrieval and less rich simulated events, highlighting the importance of visual imagery in memory and future thinking.
Dawes, A. J., Keogh, R., Robuck, S., & Pearson, J. (2022). Memories with a blind mind: remembering the past and imagining the future with aphantasia. Cognition, 227, 105192. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105192
The pupillary light response as a physiological index of aphantasia, sensory and phenomenological imagery strength
The pupillary light response not only adjusts to actual light but also reflects the vividness of visual imagery. People with aphantasia, who lack visual imagery, show no such response, confirming their condition. This discovery offers a physiological measure of imagery strength and validates aphantasia.
Kay, L., Keogh, R., Andrillon, T., & Pearson, J. (2022). The pupillary light response as a physiological index of aphantasia, sensory and phenomenological imagery strength. eLife, 11. doi:10.7554/eLife.72484
Visual working memory in aphantasia: Retained accuracy and capacity with a different strategy
Individuals with aphantasia, who lack visual imagery, perform visual working memory tasks as well as those with imagery. They use different strategies, showing that visual imagery is not essential for memory tasks. This suggests imagery is just one tool for solving visual memory challenges.
Keogh, R., Wicken, M., & Pearson, J. (2021). Visual working memory in aphantasia: retained accuracy and capacity with a different strategy. Cortex, 143, 237–253. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2021.07.012
Aphantasia: The science of visual imagery extremes
Visual imagery varies widely among individuals, from aphantasia (no imagery) to hyperphantasia (vivid imagery). These differences impact memory and perception, with aphantasia linked to prosopagnosia and hyperphantasia to synesthesia. Despite lacking visual imagery, aphantasics can still be highly imaginative.
Keogh, R., Pearson, J., & Zeman, A. (n.d.). Aphantasia: the science of visual imagery extremes. Handbook of Clinical Neurology, 277–296. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-821377-3.00012-X
The critical role of mental imagery in human emotion: insights from fear-based imagery and aphantasia
People with aphantasia, a condition where they cannot visualize images, show reduced physiological responses to imagined scary scenarios compared to those who can visualize. This suggests visual imagery amplifies emotional responses, highlighting its role in emotional experiences and potential implications for mental health treatments.
Wicken, M., Keogh, R., & Pearson, J. (2021). The critical role of mental imagery in human emotion: insights from fear-based imagery and aphantasia. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 288(1946), 20210267. doi:10.1098/rspb.2021.0267
A cognitive profile of multi-sensory imagery, memory and dreaming in aphantasia
Aphantasia is a condition where individuals can't voluntarily create visual images in their mind. This study shows that people with aphantasia also have less vivid memories and dreams, but their spatial abilities remain normal. This suggests visual imagery plays a key role in how we remember and imagine events.
Dawes, A. J., Keogh, R., Andrillon, T., & Pearson, J. (2020). A cognitive profile of multi-sensory imagery, memory and dreaming in aphantasia. Scientific Reports, 10(1). doi:10.1038/s41598-020-65705-7
Cortical excitability controls the strength of mental imagery
Lower activity in the early visual cortex predicts stronger mental imagery. Reducing visual cortex excitability with tDCS enhances imagery strength, highlighting its role in controlling mental images. This suggests a mechanism where cortical excitability influences the vividness of mental imagery.
Keogh, R., Bergmann, J., & Pearson, J. (2020). Cortical excitability controls the strength of mental imagery. eLife, 9. doi:10.7554/eLife.50232
The blind mind: No sensory visual imagery in aphantasia
Aphantasia is a condition where people can't form visual images in their mind. This study found that aphantasics have almost no sensory imagery but perform well on spatial tasks. They lack visual imagery, not self-awareness, suggesting unique brain differences.
Keogh, R., & Pearson, J. (2018). The blind mind: no sensory visual imagery in aphantasia. Cortex, 105, 53–60. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2017.10.012
The perceptual and phenomenal capacity of mental imagery
Visual imagery is limited by the brain's capacity to process visual information. This study reveals that our ability to imagine is constrained by the number and complexity of visual elements, and these limits aren't improved by more time. The findings suggest that mental imagery is influenced by both the quantity and type of information being pr...
Keogh, R., & Pearson, J. (2017). The perceptual and phenomenal capacity of mental imagery. Cognition, 162, 124–132. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.02.004
Mental Imagery and Visual Working Memory
Individuals with strong mental imagery perform better in visual working memory tasks. Background luminance affects their performance by disrupting sensory-based imagery, but not general memory tasks. Poor imagers use different strategies, suggesting diverse cognitive approaches to visual memory.
Keogh, R., & Pearson, J. (2011). Mental imagery and visual working memory. PLoS ONE, 6(12), e29221. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029221
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