AphantasiaResearch
Explore a comprehensive collection of academic papers, research studies, and scientific publications about aphantasia, imagery, and cognitive neuroscience.
Mental imagery abilities in different modalities moderate the efficacy of cognitive bias modification for interpretation bias in social anxiety
CBM-I helps reduce social anxiety by altering interpretation biases. Those with strong mental imagery abilities, especially in emotional feelings, benefit most. This internet-based training shows promise as a low-intensity intervention for social anxiety, highlighting the importance of mental imagery in its effectiveness.
Lam, C. L., Hin, A. S., Lau, L. N., Zhang, Z., & Leung, C. J. (2025). Mental imagery abilities in different modalities moderate the efficacy of cognitive bias modification for interpretation bias in social anxiety. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 88, 102031. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2025.102031
Why indecisive trials matter: Improving the binocular rivalry imagery priming score for the assessment of aphantasia
A new method for measuring mental imagery strength has been developed, improving on an existing binocular rivalry task. This enhanced approach better predicts individuals' self-reported imagery capacity, especially for those with aphantasia, a condition where people struggle to visualize images. The new scoring system is more reliable and effective for future research.
Monzel, M., Scholz, C. O., Pearson, J., & Reuter, M. (2025). Why indecisive trials matter: improving the binocular rivalry imagery priming score for the assessment of aphantasia. Behavior Research Methods, 57(9). doi:10.3758/s13428-025-02780-6
Aphantasia does not affect veridical and false memory: Evidence from the DRM paradigm
Aphantasia, a reduced ability to form mental images, doesn't affect the creation of false memories in verbal tasks. People with higher visual imagery might recall more but also make more errors. Aphantasia doesn't shield against false memories, suggesting visual tasks may be needed for further study.
Pauly-Takacs, K., Younus, S., Sigala, N., & Pfeifer, G. (2025). Aphantasia does not affect veridical and false memory: evidence from the drm paradigm. Consciousness and Cognition, 133, 103888. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2025.103888
Challenging dual-coding theory: Picture superiority is preserved in aphantasia
Research shows that people with aphantasia, who can't create mental images, still remember pictures and symbols better than words. This challenges the idea that memory relies solely on visual and verbal codes. Aphantasic individuals even recall symbols better than pictures, suggesting that memory works in ways beyond traditional theories, prompting a reevaluation of how we understand memory processes.
Yan, M., Roberts, B. R., & Bainbridge, W. A. (2025). Challenging dual-coding theory: picture superiority is preserved in aphantasia. Journal of Vision, 25(9), 1974. doi:10.1167/jov.25.9.1974
Individual variability in mental imagery vividness does not predict perceptual interference with imagery: A replication study of Cui et al. (2007).
A study with 241 participants found no link between mental imagery vividness and perceptual interference, challenging a 2007 study's findings. However, those who can project mental images externally (prophantasia) showed improved perceptual performance, suggesting a need to rethink how mental imagery affects perception.
Azañón, E., Pounder, Z., Figueroa, A., & Reeder, R. R. (2025). Individual variability in mental imagery vividness does not predict perceptual interference with imagery: a replication study of cui et al. (2007).. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 154(7), 2043–2057. doi:10.1037/xge0001756
Absence of shared representation in the visual cortex challenges unconscious imagery in aphantasia
Aphantasia is defined as the absence (or near-absence) of imagery experience, most commonly in but not necessarily limited to the visual modality. While the neural and cognitive underpinnings of aphantasia remain hotly debated (see Zeman1 for a recent review), a proposal that has recently gained attention is that people with aphantasia may have unconscious mental imagery2, meaning that despite lacking the experience associated with imagery, they may still possess the relevant neural activity. A recent article in Current Biology by Chang et al.3 reported finding ‘imageless imagery’ in aphantasic subjects, thus seemingly supporting this view. However, we argue here that the representations found in aphantasic subjects by Chang et al.3, as well as in other studies (e.g., by Liu et al.4,5), should not be viewed as unconscious imagery because they fail to show the perception-like pattern usually associated with mental imagery.
Scholz, C. O., Monzel, M., & Liu, J. (2025). Absence of shared representation in the visual cortex challenges unconscious imagery in aphantasia. Current Biology, 35(13), R645–R646. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2025.05.009
“Diversity makes the richness of humanity”: The emergence and persistence of mental imagery after self-reported psilocybin truffles intake in an autistic woman with “blind imagination” (aphantasia): A 33-month retrospective case report
An autistic woman with aphantasia experienced vivid mental imagery for the first time after consuming psilocybin truffles. Her ability to visualize persisted beyond the psychedelic effects, suggesting psilocybin's potential to alter mental imagery. This case highlights cognitive diversity and challenges the pathologization of aphantasia.
Rebecchi, K. (2025). “diversity makes the richness of humanity”: the emergence and persistence of mental imagery after self-reported psilocybin truffles intake in an autistic woman with “blind imagination” (aphantasia): a 33-month retrospective case report. Journal of Psychedelic Studies. doi:10.1556/2054.2025.00320
Dissociating voluntary mental imagery and mental simulation: Evidence from aphantasia
People with aphantasia, who can't visualize images in their mind, can still understand language through mental simulation, similar to those who can visualize. This suggests that visual imagery and mental simulation are distinct cognitive processes.
Speed, L. J., Geraerds, E. M. E., & McRae, K. (2025). Dissociating voluntary mental imagery and mental simulation: evidence from aphantasia. Memory & Cognition. doi:10.3758/s13421-025-01731-y
Mental imagery through the lens of aphantasia
Nanay suggests that people with aphantasia, who lack mental imagery, have unconscious mental imagery. However, recent findings challenge this, indicating that individuals with aphantasia do not possess unconscious mental imagery, contrary to Nanay's theory.
Scholz, C. O. (2025). Mental imagery through the lens of aphantasia. Mind & Language, 40(3), 317–324. doi:10.1111/mila.12560
Aphantasia as a functional disconnection
Brain scans reveal that people with aphantasia, who can't visualize images mentally, still process visual information normally. The issue lies in reduced communication between brain areas responsible for visual imagery and conscious awareness, explaining why they remember visual details without experiencing mental images.
Liu, J., & Bartolomeo, P. (2025). Aphantasia as a functional disconnection. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.05.012
Beyond words: Examining the role of mental imagery for the Stroop effect by contrasting aphantasics and controls
The Stroop effect, where conflicting color words disrupt cognitive processing, was tested in individuals with aphantasia—who struggle with mental imagery. Results showed a reduced Stroop effect in aphantasics, suggesting that mental imagery interferes with perception. This finding may impact how Stroop tasks are used in psychological assessments.
Monzel, M., Rademacher, J., Krempel, R., & Reuter, M. (2025). Beyond words: examining the role of mental imagery for the stroop effect by contrasting aphantasics and controls. Cognition, 259, 106120. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106120
Visual imagery vividness appears to be independent of perceptual and memory precision
The vividness of visual mental imagery, ranging from aphantasia to hyperphantasia, does not affect the precision of visual memory. Contrary to expectations, people with vivid imagery do not have better memory precision than those with weak imagery, suggesting that other strategies, like verbal encoding, may play a bigger role.
Thorudottir, S., Asgeirsson, A. G., & Sigurdardottir, H. M. (n.d.). Visual imagery vividness appears to be independent of perceptual and memory precision. doi:10.31234/osf.io/ahtsd
Impoverished recall of sensory details along infrequently travelled routes in aphantasia
Individuals with aphantasia have intact spatial memory for frequently traveled routes, recalling similar details as those without aphantasia. However, they recall fewer sensory details for infrequent routes, indicating reliance on compensatory strategies. This suggests spatial memory involves processes independent of visual imagery.
Li, A., Arrieta, M., Levine, B., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2025). Impoverished recall of sensory details along infrequently travelled routes in aphantasia. Memory, 1–13. doi:10.1080/09658211.2025.2507948
Aphantasia: a philosophical approach
Aphantasia, the inability to visualize mental images, may be due to a lack of sub-personal imagistic representations or a disconnection between these representations and conscious awareness. While some hypotheses are rejected, further research could clarify the condition's underlying mechanisms.
Lorenzatti, J. J. (2025). Aphantasia: a philosophical approach. Philosophical Psychology, 38(4), 1476–1504. doi:10.1080/09515089.2023.2253854
Diverse Minds: Exploring Individual Differences in Visual Imagery and Special Cases
Visual imagery varies greatly among individuals, from aphantasia (no mental images) to hyperphantasia (vivid images). Understanding these differences is crucial for improving educational strategies, therapies, and cognitive research. Current measurement methods are limited, highlighting the need for further study, especially on hyperphantasia.
DeKock, K. (2025). Diverse minds: exploring individual differences in visual imagery and special cases. The Confluence, 4(1). doi:10.62608/2150-2633.1069
Interoception, insula, and agency: a predictive coding account of aphantasia
Aphantasia, the inability to create mental images, may stem from how the brain processes internal signals via the insula. This affects the integration of bodily sensations with mental processes, reducing the sense of agency over imagery creation, though visual dreams remain possible.
Silvanto, J. (2025). Interoception, insula, and agency: a predictive coding account of aphantasia. Frontiers in Psychology, 16. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1564251
The Phenomenology of Offline Perception: Multisensory Profiles of Voluntary Mental Imagery and Dream Imagery
Dreams and voluntary mental imagery share similarities as "offline perceptions," but differ in vividness across senses. Dream imagery is more emotional and visual, while voluntary imagery is stronger in other senses. Dream recall and lucid dreaming can make these experiences more alike, highlighting the role of metacognition.
Bilzer, M., & Monzel, M. (2025). The phenomenology of offline perception: multisensory profiles of voluntary mental imagery and dream imagery. Vision, 9(2), 37. doi:10.3390/vision9020037
Aphantasia reimagined
Aphantasia, the inability to visualize, is often misunderstood due to reliance on a single 'vividness' scale. This paper suggests aphantasia involves a lack of visual-object imagery but preserved spatial imagery, explaining why individuals can perform tasks requiring imagery despite reporting no visual experiences.
Phillips, I. (2025). Aphantasia reimagined. Noûs. doi:10.1111/nous.12551
The Impact of Soothing Media on the Content of Prospective Mental Imagery. Photo-Elicitation and Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis Study
Positive mental imagery (PMI) can help reduce anxiety and depression but is often hard to generate. This study found that soothing videos make it easier to create vivid PMI about goals, family, and travel, regardless of age or nationality, suggesting potential clinical benefits.
Gouveia Gaglianone, C., Zhu, L., Gillespie-Smith, K., & Schwannauer, M. (2025). The impact of soothing media on the content of prospective mental imagery. photo-elicitation and interpretative phenomenological analysis study. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 44(3), 257–286. doi:10.1177/02762366241306398
How Interoception and the Insula Shape Mental Imagery and Aphantasia
Aphantasia, the inability to visualize mental images, may stem from how the brain integrates sensory experiences with internal body awareness. Key brain regions, the insula and anterior cingulate cortex, blend sensory and bodily signals, making imagery feel real. In aphantasia, these regions might not communicate effectively, affecting memory an...
Silvanto, J., & Nagai, Y. (2025). How interoception and the insula shape mental imagery and aphantasia. Brain Topography, 38(2). doi:10.1007/s10548-025-01101-6