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Aphantasia, SDAM, and Episodic Memory

DOI: 10.4288/jafpos.28.0_9
BRONS, L. (n.d.). <i>aphantasia, sdam, and episodic memory</i>. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, 28(0), 9–32. doi:10.4288/jafpos.28.0_9

Abstract

Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphantasics (who lack mental imagery) and people with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) lack the ability to re-experience, which would imply that they don't have EM. However, aphantasics and people with SDAM have personal and affective memories, which are other defining aspects of EM (in addition to re-experiencing). This suggests that these supposed aspects of EM really are independent faculties or modules of memory, and that EM is a composite faculty rather than a natural kind. Apparent varieties of (normal and "defective") EM (as well as some closely related kinds of memory) are different combinations of these modules, and the EM construct itself adds little if any explanatory value to these modules.

Authors

  • Lajos BRONS1

Understanding Episodic Memory: A New Perspective

Overview/Introduction

Episodic memory is often thought of as the ability to re-experience past events through mental imagery. However, recent research challenges this view by examining individuals with aphantasia (who lack mental imagery) and those with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM). Despite their inability to re-experience events vividly, these individuals still possess personal and emotional memories. This suggests that episodic memory might not be a single, unified faculty but rather a composite of different memory modules.

Methodology

The study involved analyzing existing literature and data on aphantasia and SDAM. Researchers examined how these conditions affect memory and whether they challenge the traditional understanding of episodic memory. The study also considered feedback from over 10,000 individuals who reported experiences related to aphantasia and hyperphantasia (extremely vivid imagery).

Key Findings

  • Independence of Memory Modules: The research suggests that personal and emotional memories are independent from the ability to re-experience events through imagery. This implies that episodic memory is not a single entity but a combination of different memory types.
  • Compensation Mechanisms: Individuals with aphantasia or SDAM may use other cognitive strategies to compensate for their lack of imagery. For example, they might rely on verbal descriptions or conceptual understanding rather than visualizing events.
  • Normal Cognitive Functioning: Despite their differences in memory processing, individuals with aphantasia and SDAM do not show significant cognitive impairments in everyday tasks.

Implications

  • Rethinking Memory: This research encourages a shift in how we understand memory, suggesting it is more modular and less unified than previously thought. This could impact how memory-related conditions are diagnosed and treated.
  • Educational and Therapeutic Approaches: Understanding the modular nature of memory could lead to more tailored educational strategies and therapies for individuals with memory deficits, focusing on strengthening other memory modules.

Limitations

  • Need for Further Research: The study highlights the need for more research to fully understand the implications of these findings. Specifically, more data is needed to explore how different memory modules interact and compensate for each other.
  • Self-Reporting Challenges: Much of the data relies on self-reported experiences, which can be subjective and vary widely among individuals.
In summary, this research provides a fresh perspective on episodic memory, suggesting it is a composite of various independent memory modules. This new understanding could have significant implications for how we approach memory in both clinical and everyday contexts.